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In 2005, Korean government newly introduced the direct payments program for rice industry 
which had long been strongly supported with a purchasing scheme. This policy shift to direct 
payment from the typical price support is aimed at adapting the rice market to the market-
oriented system as is required under the WTO regime. The abolition of government purchasing 
scheme which had lasted for more than half a century came as a shock to Korean farmers in that 
rice has been their main income source. 
An important question regarding such a policy change is whether the new policy can be in 
harmony with the goal of market orientation. In other words, can it meet the requirement of 
decoupling as is stipulated in the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) appendix 2 (Green Box)? 
One way to answer this question is to estimate the degree of decoupling of the program.   
Empirical works on this issue in association with the WTO agricultural policy reform have 
been done recently since late 1990s. Previous works are relatively rare at the early stage in this 
field, and most of them are for the EU and US domestic policies. Studies on this issue for Asian 
agriculture-protective nations such as Korea and Japan are hardly found yet, although they are 
now rapidly moving toward market orientation as is seen in the agricultural policy reform for 
the Korean rice described above.   
First attempt on this issue for Korean rice was made by Lee (2005). This study, using simple 
static  model  under  deterministic  environment  focusing  on  the  development  of  theoretical 
framework,  shows  that  the  degree  of  decoupling  of  the  Korea’s  direct  payments  varies 
depending on predetermined target price, the rate of support, market price, and the share of 
fixed direct payments. Also, the simulation result of this paper carefully leads to the tentative 
claim that the Korea’s new direct payments program is highly unlikely to meet the Green Box 
requirement as is provided in the AoA appendix 2. However, this result cannot be conclusive, 
and it might be misleading the true consequences of the newly adopted program since it does 
not consider the uncertainty and producer’s risk preference. 
Unlike the first preliminary paper discussed above, this study will be conducted within a 
stochastic framework under uncertainty. As Hennessy demonstrated in the AJAE (1998), it is 
generally believed that the direct payments are more likely to affect production due to wealth 
and insurance effects when producer’s risk preference is considered. Producer’s problem will 
then be modeled to maximize the expected utility of the farm profits for the single rice market.   
The purpose of this study is to estimate the degree of decoupling of newly adopted direct 
payments for Korea’s rice industry in order to see how the program is decoupled or coupled 
with  rice  production.  This  will  help  us  to  determine  whether  the  new  program  could  be   2 
classified as being under the so-called Green Box category, as was initially intended by the 
Korean government. For this purpose, the structure and characteristics of the Korea’s direct 
payments program will be briefly examined first. Then, theoretical framework featuring the 
structural characteristic of the program will be built to estimate the degree of decoupling under 
uncertainty,  assuming  that  rice  producers  are  risk  averse.  The  degree  of  decoupling  of  the 
program will be empirically estimated, and discussions on whether the program can meet the 




II. Model for Direct Payments Program 
 
2.1 Structural Characteristics of Direct Payments Program 
 
The goal of the newly introduced direct payments for Korean rice industry is to compensate 
for the income loss resulting from the elimination of government purchasing program which 
served as market price support in such a manner as not distorting rice market. This program 
consists of two types of direct payments, i.e., fixed and variable direct payments. The nature of 
fixed payment is like lump-sum transfer whereas variable payment is price-dependable. 
      The fixed payment is provided based on the fixed land area on which rice had been grown 
during the past three years 1998-2000. This payment is given without any prerequisites on rice 
production  as  long  as  producers  are  eligible  for  this  requirement.  Any  farmers  who  own 
farmland which had been used for rice production during the past three years above can receive 
this payment regardless of producing rice currently or in the future. The payment is not linked to 
production of any crop. The land can even be idled. The amount of 600,000 won per hectare is 
given as fixed payment. All that farmers have to do is to maintain the farmland as it has been in 
an environment-friendly manner by keeping water on it. 
The second type is variable direct payment which is linked directly and indirectly to rice 
production. To receive this payment farmers have to produce rice on the farmland suitable for 
fixed payment described above. Actual payment occurs when some condition is fulfilled that 
market price falls substantially below predetermined target price. If market price of rice is lower 
than the target price, some part of the gap between these two prices is compensated by variable 
payment. Farmers receive the additional amount of money as variable direct payment when 
market price is so low that fixed direct payment is short of 85% of the difference between target 
price and market price. Government sets a target price which is normally higher than market 
price. If it is small enough to be fully covered by fixed payment no variable payment is financed.   3 
But if market price is so low that fixed payment is not enough to cover the amount of 85% of 
the price gap, variable direct payment is additionally given to farmers so as to fully compensate 
for the amount.   
Currently, the target price is set at 170,000 won/80kg. Rice price is usually measured by the 
unit of gama, which is equivalent to 80kg. Yield is fixed for this program as 61 gama per 
hectare (4,880 kg/ha) which is annual average yield during the recent five years. Therefore, the 
amount of fixed payment 600,000 won/ha is equivalent to 9,836 won/80kg in terms of variable 
payment. When 85% of the gap between target price and market price exceeds 9,836 won/80kg 
the  variable  direct  payment  is  provided additionally.  Consequently,  under  the  current  direct 
payment program, eligible farmers can receive the market price plus 85% of the difference 
between target and market prices.   
 
 
2.2 Analytical Model 
 
Under the current direct payments program, profit for a representative farmer who is price-
taker can be expressed as: 
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where  p is  market  price  which  is  random  variable  and  determined  in  a  closed  economy. 
p p E = ) (   and 
2 ) ( σ = p Var . Production function is assumed to depend only on land  x , i.e. 
) (x q q = .  Production  is  also  stochastic  variable,  the  nature  of  which  risk  is  assumed 





Var q = =σ δ .  r   is the amount 
of fixed payment per hectare for the total land area  o x   which were used for rice production 
during 1998-2000, and hence are fixed.  θ   is the rate of support ranging from 0 to 1( ) 1 0 ≤ ≤θ . 
p ˆ   is  a  predetermined  target  price  which  is  normally  higher  than  market  price.  Y   is  an 
average yield per hectare for the land applied to direct payments and is assumed fixed. Since  q 
is  a  function  solely  of  land  x   and  Y   is  fixed,  production  here  can  also  be  expressed  as 
xY q = . Therefore,  Y r   becomes fixed direct payment per gama(80kg).  w  is price of factor 
(land).   
Producers receive  o rx   as fixed direct payment and  ( ) ( )q Y r p p − − ˆ θ   as variable direct 
payment unless  ( ) Y r p p ≤ − ˆ θ . It is assumed here that  ( ) 0 ˆ ≥ − − Y r p p θ . Here it is also 
assumed, without loss of generality, that the choice variable  x   is not greater than  o x , i.e.   4 
o x x ≤ . The quantity produced for variable payment is determined by the area planted with 
fixed yield  ( ) xY , which is in turn to be multiplied by its unit price per gama to calculate total 
amount of variable direct payment. The actual quantity produced may differ from it because 
actual yield each year may be different from average yield  Y , which is fixed for the program, 
due to uncertainty such as weather conditions. However, since actual yield as a whole will be 
equal to  Y   on average, it is assumed here that actual production is equal to the production for 
variable direct payment. 
Risk-averse producer will then maximize the von Neumann-Morgenstern’s expected utility 
of profit under price uncertainty as follows. 
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In  this  study,  however,  producer  is  assumed  to  maximize  certainty  equivalent  of  the  profit 
without introducing specific utility function as is the case in OECD(2004). With concave utility 
function for risk-averse preference, certainty equivalent profit  ( ) π ˆ   can be expressed as: 
 
(3)                        ( ) ρ π ρ π π − = − = E ˆ  
 
The  risk  premium  ρ   is  approximately  measured  as  follows  using  Taylor  series  expansion 
(Newberry and Stiglitz, 1981). 
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where  A  and  R   are  coefficient  of  absolute  risk  aversion  and  coefficient  of  relative  risk 
















− = . Then, certainty equivalent profit 
can be expressed as follows for the two cases, constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and 
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). 
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− =                     for DARA 
   5 
Risk tends to decline as income rises so that the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion 
will be more realistic. Constant relative risk aversion is associated with decreasing absolute risk 
aversion assumption. Both DARA and CARA cases will be examined in measuring the degrees 
of decoupling for the direct payments program.   
      Expected value and variance of profit under price and quantity uncertainties are derived as 
follows, respectively. 
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From  (5)  using  equations  (6)  and  (7),  first  order  condition  is  obtained  under  constant 
absolute risk aversion as: 
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Since this condition always holds at optimal point, following expression can also be obtained by 
solving it for  q . 
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The expected rice production depends on various factors as seen above. It is directly affected by 
not  only  risk  and uncertainty-related  variables  but  direct  payment-related  variables  as  well. 















1 * .  Here,   6 
dx q d
w
  is regarded as marginal cost at optimal point. 
Similar procedure for the DARA assumption yields following first-order condition. 
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k =   which  is  assumed  to  be  constant  at  equilibrium.  This  first-order  condition 
always holds at optimal production with optimal use of input. Hence, by solving equation (10) 
for  q   we can obtain the optimal production as follows. 
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π
            for DARA 
 
Under DARA assumption, the parenthesis term on the right-hand side is added compared with 
CARA  case.  Without  direct  payment  program,  it  would  be 





























      To  calculate  the  degree  of  decoupling,  fully  decoupled  output  ( ) o q   and  fully  coupled 
output  ( ) 1 q   are  defined.  Fully  decoupled  output  is  obtained  by  setting  θ   and  r   to  zero 
( 0 = = r θ ) under closed economy, which is the output without program. Fully coupled output 
is obtained when  1 = θ   and  0 = r , which is considered the equivalent output resulting from 
price  support  program  with  its  support  price  set  at  target  price  p ˆ .  Then  the  degree  of 
decoupling (DD ) for the rice direct payment program can be calculated as follows. 
 













Complex expressions stemming from uncertainty are included in optimal output equations. 
Now  suppose  that  λ is  correlation  coefficient  between  price  and  quantity  produced,  i.e.     7 
( ) ( )
q q






= = . Then following expressions will hold, which will be used to 
facilitate computing the degrees of decoupling (see Newbery and Stiglitz (1985) Ch. 13 and 
Appendix therein).  
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III. Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1 Data and Calibration for risk aversion coefficients 
 
  In this chapter, ex ante simulation is conducted to see the degree of decoupling for the 
Korea’s  direct  payment  in  rice  industry.  Past  four  years  from  2001  to  2004  before  the 
implementation of direct payment program is used for base year for empirical examination. Data, 
most of which are obtained from Major Statistics on Agriculture and Forestry by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, are summarized in Table 1. The average rice production per farm is 
5.1032 ton (63.75  gama).  Monthly  market  prices  during  this  period  were  used  to  calculate 
average  rice  price,  variance  and  coefficient  of  variation.  Data  for  these  price  variables  are 
obtained from the database of Korea Agro-Fisheries Trade Corporation. They are computed as 
637 , 161 = p won/80kg,  ( )= p Var 17,361,614  and  ( )= p CV 0.025778.  Average  yield  per 
hectare is assumed 4,880kg (61 gama). 
Assuming that marginal and average products of land are the same, rice yield per hectare is 
used for the proxy of  dx q d /   as rice production can also be approximated from  xY q = . 
Land is only input used in this model so that total cost is equal to land cost. Since total cost per 
hectare  is  5,614,490  won,  =
dx q d
w
92,040.8  won/80kg.  This  is  equivalent  to  marginal  or 
average cost in this study. Therefore, profit at equilibrium per gama is automatically estimated 
as 69,596.2 won (Table 2).   8 
      Using  these  data,  the  absolute  and  relative  coefficients  of  risk  aversion  are  estimated, 
respectively, as  = A 0.0000036 and  = R 31.9 by calibrating the model at base year production 
with  0 = = r θ   (Table 2). These figures differ from previous empirical work (Kwon, 2002) 
where average  A  and  R   are estimated as 
7 10 26 . 6
− ×   and 3.198, respectively.   
 
 
[Table 1] Summary of Historical Data Used 
Variables  Descriptions  Values 
p   Average market price  161,637 won/80kg 
p ˆ  




Average  rice  production  per  farm 
household 
5.1 ton (63.75 gama) 
r  




Average rice yield applied to direct 
payments program 
4,880kg (61 gama) 
Y r  




Average profit per farm household 
from rice production 
4,436,758 won/farm 
(69,596 won/gama) 













   9 
[Table 2] Summary of the Estimated Data for Empirical Analysis 
Variables  Descriptions  Values 
2 σ (σ ) 
Variance (standard deviation) of market 
price 
17,361,614(4,167) 
p σ  




q σ ( q σ )  Variance (standard deviation) of  δ   0.0006938(0.08329) 
( ) q p Cov ,  










Marginal  (average)  cost  of  rice 
production 
92,040.8 won/gama 
( ) δ p E   Expected value of  δ p   161,960 
( ) δ p Var   Variance of  δ p   303,191,000 
( ) δ δ, p Cov   Covariance between  δ p   and  δ   1,444.189 









k   Ratio of revenue to profit  2.322497 
A  Coefficient of absolute risk aversion  0.0000036 





3.2 Production effects and Degrees of Decoupling 
 
      Table 3 shows the ex ante simulation results of the degrees of decoupling for Korea’s rice 
direct payment program under the current target price at 170,000 won/80kg and  = Y r / 9,836 
won/80kg.  Simulation  is  conducted  by  varying  θ   between  1.0  and  0.5,  assuming  that  the 
average  market  price  is  expected  to  remain  at  153,000  and  136,000  won/80kg.  Degrees  of 
decoupling under uncertainty for CARA and DARA cases are also compared with previous 
work (Lee, 2005) which was done under deterministic environment without considering risk 
factors. Degree of decoupling by his simple model is calculated by following expression.   10 
 












1 θ  
 
      Under  the  current  support  level  of  = θ 0.85,  the  degrees  of  decoupling  turn  out  to  be 
significantly low, ranging between 0.208 and 0.234 for CARA case and between 0.303 and 
0.367 for DARA case when market prices are expected to move at 136,000 – 153,000 won/80kg, 
on average. This can be interpreted as current direct payment program substantially affecting 
rice production. No significant differences in degrees of decoupling are found depending on the 
levels  of  expected  market  prices.  Even  under  very  low  market  prices  being  assumed  like 
136,000 won/80kg the results are not significantly different from those with fairly high market 
price of 153,000 won/80kg. This is because the high target price and  θ   play a key role to 
strongly support rice prices received by producers no matter how low market prices fall. 
Degrees  of  decoupling  under  DARA  assumption  tend  to  be  larger  than those  under  CARA 
assumption.  This  tendency  becomes  more  conspicuous  as  support  level  θ   becomes  larger. 
Compared with the results in this study, the results of previous work are much higher. 
      If  = θ 1.0,  degree  of  decoupling  under  CARA  is  nearly  zero,  implying  that  production 
effects of direct payment program is as strong as price support policy while that of previous 
work is fairly high. Moreover, according to the previous results, there exist big differences in 
degrees  of  decoupling  depending  on  market  price  levels,  which  should  not  be  the  case  as 
discussed above. When  θ   declines to 0.5, the degrees of decoupling rise up to higher than 0.6, 
reaching even 0.756. 
Now, the same simulation is conducted under the assumption that fixed payment is increased 
to  = Y r 15,000 won/80kg, of which results are shown in Table 4. The increase in fixed direct 
payment  lead to the fall  in  degrees  of  decoupling  as  is  expected.  However, the  production 
effects is relatively small even though it has increased more than 1.5 times the current level of 
9,836. This implies that the increase in the share of fixed payment does not play an important 
role in  reducing  production  as  long  as  current  variable  direct  payment  scheme  is  in  place, 
because current direct payment program with high target price provides minimum rice price for 
producers as high as 1445,000 won/80kg, for instance, with  = θ 0.85. 
Table 5 shows the simulation results under the assumption of  = Y r 0. No fixed payment is 
paid in this case. Production effects become significantly worse as is indicated by lower degrees 
of decoupling.  In this case, the production effects of direct payment program with  = θ 1.0 
become exactly the same as price support program as degrees of decoupling are all zeroes. 
However,  as  θ   decreases  degrees  of  decoupling  become  larger.  Two  interesting  points  are 
found in this case. The degrees of decoupling under DARA assumption are smaller, although   11 
not significant, than those of CARA case, which is reversed compared with Table 3 and 4. One 
possible interpretation can be attributable to the income effect. Fixed payment, unlike variable 
one, is believed to have income or wealth effect under uncertainty. As income effect disappears 
with  Y r   approaching zero, the difference in production effects between CARA and DARA 
cases becomes smaller. Another point is that both results of this study and previous one get very 




[Table 3] Degrees of Decoupling for the Korea’s Rice Direct Payments Program ( = Y r 9,836) 
Risk Averse 
θ   p  
CARA  DARA 
Previous Work 
153,000  0.037  0.183  0.579 
1.00 
136,000  0.033  0.139  0.289 
153,000  0.104  0.245  0.629 
0.95 
136,000  0.092  0.194  0.339 
153,000  0.170  0.307  0.679 
0.90 
136,000  0.150  0.248  0.389 
153,000  0.234  0.367  0.729 
0.85 
136,000  0.208  0.303  0.439 
153,000  0.296  0.426  0.779 
0.80 
136,000  0.265  0.358  0.489 
153,000  0.357  0.484  0.829 
0.75 
136,000  0.323  0.412  0.539 
153,000  0.416  0.541  0.879 
0.70 
136,000  0.380  0.466  0.589 
153,000  0.473  0.596  0.929 
0.65 
136,000  0.436  0.520  0.639 
153,000  0.529  0.651  0.979 
0.60 
136,000  0.493  0.574  0.689 
153,000  0.584  0.704  1.029 
0.55 
136,000  0.549  0.628  0.739 
153,000  0.637  0.756  1.079 
0.50 
136,000  0.605  0.681  0.789 
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[Table 4] Degrees of Decoupling for the Korea’s Rice Direct Payments Program ( = Y r 15,000) 
Risk Averse 
θ   p  
CARA  DARA 
Previous Work 
153,000  0.068  0.287  0.882 
1.00 
136,000  0.061  0.217  0.441 
153,000  0.138  0.352  0.932 
0.95 
136,000  0.123  0.275  0.491 
153,000  0.206  0.415  0.982 
0.90 
136,000  0.185  0.332  0.541 
153,000  0.272  0.477  1.032 
0.85 
136,000  0.246  0.388  0.591 
153,000  0.337  0.538  1.082 
0.80 
136,000  0.307  0.445  0.641 
153,000  0.400  0.597  1.132 
0.75 
136,000  0.368  0.501  0.691 
153,000  0.461  0.655  1.182 
0.70 
136,000  0.429  0.558  0.741 
153,000  0.520  0.712  1.232 
0.65 
136,000  0.489  0.614  0.791 
153,000  0.578  0.768  1.282 
0.60 
136,000  0.549  0.669  0.841 
153,000  0.634  0.822  1.332 
0.55 
136,000  0.608  0.725  0.891 
153,000  0.689  0.876  1.382 
0.50 
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[Table 5] Degrees of Decoupling for the Korea’s Rice Direct Payments Program ( = Y r 0) 
Risk Averse 
θ   p  
CARA  DARA 
Previous Work 
153,000  0.000  0.000  0.00 
1.00 
136,000  0.000  0.000  0.00 
153,000  0.063  0.059  0.05 
0.95 
136,000  0.052  0.051  0.05 
153,000  0.124  0.117  0.10 
0.90 
136,000  0.104  0.103  0.10 
153,000  0.183  0.174  0.15 
0.85 
136,000  0.156  0.154  0.15 
153,000  0.241  0.230  0.20 
0.80 
136,000  0.208  0.205  0.20 
153,000  0.298  0.285  0.25 
0.75 
136,000  0.260  0.256  0.25 
153,000  0.353  0.339  0.30 
0.70 
136,000  0.311  0.306  0.30 
153,000  0.407  0.392  0.35 
0.65 
136,000  0.362  0.357  0.35 
153,000  0.460  0.444  0.40 
0.60 
136,000  0.412  0.407  0.40 
153,000  0.511  0.495  0.45 
0.55 
136,000  0.463  0.458  0.45 
153,000  0.561  0.545  0.50 
0.50 





The decoupling-related problems are drawing much attention recently, especially in the arena 
of the WTO trade negotiations as the reduction of domestic supports becomes one of the most 
important issues in the Doha Development Agenda talks. The AoA demands that the production 
effects of domestic supports be zero or ‘at most minimal’ in order for them to be exempted from 
reduction commitments. Then, question is how can we use and interpret the resulting degrees of 
decoupling to judge the ‘at most minimal’ criterion. In other words, what is the dividing line   14 
between Green and Blue Box categories in terms of the degree of decoupling expressed as some 
numbers normally ranging between 0 and 1.   
The greater the degrees of decoupling, the closer approaches the direct payment program to 
Green Box category, i.e. “at most minimal” production effects. However, it seems too arbitrary 
to draw clear dividing line in terms of calculated degrees of decoupling to distinguish between 
Green and Amber Boxes, although not impossible. Based on the overall ex ante simulation 
results above, current direct payment program for Korea’s rice industry with target price of 
170,000 won/80kg and the rate of support of 85% could not be safely included in Green Box 
category. This study also shows that the increase in the share of fixed payment may not be a 
good solution as long as variable payment with high target price exists. If the government 
wishes to adapt Korea’s rice industry to market-oriented system as is in the Green Box criteria 
of AoA, current variable direct payment may need to be replaced by fixed payment, or at least 
be substantially weakened by reducing target price and/or the rate of support along with the 
increase  in  fixed  payment.  But  this  would  not  avoid  another  problem  of  how  to  maintain 





      The purpose of this study is to estimate the degrees of decoupling for the direct payments 
program newly introduced in Korea’s rice industry to see whether it can fall under the Green 
Box category of AoA or not. First, structural characteristics of the program are examined briefly 
to be captured in the model. This program is characterized by the two different types of direct 
payments, fixed and variable ones, combined together in it.   
It is assumed here that risk-averse producer maximizes certainty equivalent profit under 
uncertainty  instead  of  specifying  empirical  utility  function.  To  calculate  the  degrees  of 
decoupling,  optimal  outputs  are  found  for  CARA  and  DARA  cases  from  the  maximization 
problem of certainty equivalent profit using risk premium. 
Ex ante simulations were conducted to identify production effects and estimate the degrees 
of decoupling by varying the rates of support and fixed payments. The results show that there is 
high possibility that current direct payment program has substantial effects on rice production, 
being unable to meet Green Box requirement due to variable direct payment. For the variable 
direct payment, unlike fixed payment, the target price set higher than market price is directly 
linked to payment, boosting market prices that producers receive. The increase in the share of 
fixed payment helps ease production effects. But its effect would be limited as minimum price 
could be provided by variable payment depending on the target price level and the rate of   15 
support. For the current direct payment program to be in full harmony with Green Box criteria, 
it  would  be  necessary  to  replace  the  variable  payment  with  fixed  payment  along  with  the 
increase in fixed payment. However, this choice does not seem to be plausible in the foreseeable 
future for Korea seeking to maintain certain level of domestic rice production. 
To make this study more interesting and practically useful, further research is necessary with 
more sophisticated methodology. Disaggregation of insurance and wealth effects of the total 
production effects along with the examination of risk-reducing effects of the program can be a 
useful theme associated with this study as a future research direction. Also, such study needs to 
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